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the study of ethnopolitics need to be updated in light of the latest developments and
the increasing impact of new catalysts. These are, namely, anti-immigration and the
rise of the populist and radical right across Central and Eastern Europe. This chapter
hints that the more systematic cooperation between academic experts in nationalism
and academic experts in the populist and radical right will enable: (a) the former to
assess more accurately the degree to which new variables such as Euroscepticism
and anti-immigrant trends can reshape ethnopolitics, both as a living reality and a
field of study, across Central and Eastern Europe; (b) the latter to formulate new
interpretative models about how (right-wing) populist and Eurosceptic actors
embed their agendas inside the pre-existing political cultures of nationalism and
particularistic identity and memory politics. This chapter introduces and outlines the
ethnosymbolic approach as well as the triadic and quadratic configurations of
ethnopolitics. Then, it proceeds into a more empirical assessment of the applica-
bility of these theoretical approaches in a series of case studies during the 1990s, as
well as the more recent emergence of new catalysts and the ensuing necessity to
update and upgrade the existing theoretical models.
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Introduction
Whereas biopolitics centre on people and geopolitics concentrate on territories,
ethnopolitics appear to occupy the intermediate space. If only schematically, one
might argue that ethnopolitics interlink groups of people, who are bounded together
by an agglomerate of sociocultural affinities through time (the ethnos/ethnie), with
specific territories. This explains the interdisciplinarity of ethnopolitics. This field of
study has incorporated theoretical and methodological approaches from modern
history, political science, as well as sociology and cultural studies. In light of this
high diversity and limited space, this section casts its focus on two ostensibly
divergent, yet mutually complementary, models in the study of ethnopolitics: the
ethnosymbolic approach (Connor 1993; Smith 1999, 2000, 2007) and selected
approaches to ethnopolitics beyond groups and groupism (Brubaker 1995, 2002).
The 1990s witnessed the either contested (e.g. Yugoslavia) or negotiated (e.g.
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union) dissolutions offederal states across Central and
Eastern Europe. This process culminated with the emergence of a string of contro-
versies over territorial integrity, state sovereignty, self-determination and minority
rights throughout this macro-region. Soon, these groundbreaking developments
captivated the interest of academic experts in ethnopolitics all over the globe. A series
of specialists formulated their theoretical models for the study of nationalism and
ethnopolitics on the basis of empirical material drawn from case studies in this par-
ticular macro-region. Therefore, special attention in this chapter is paid to the con-
temporary state of affairs in ethnopolitics along the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea,
including complementary references to other parts of Central and Eastern Europe (e.g.
the former Yugoslavia and the Visegrad Four states) were deemed appropriate.
The major objective here is to illustrate why and how the existing theoretical
models in ethnopolitics need to be updated in light of the latest developments and
the increasing impact of new catalysts (namely anti-immigration and the rise of the
populist and radical right) across Central and Eastern Europe. This chapter also
hints that the more systematic cooperation between academic experts in nationalism
and academic experts in the populist and radical right will enable: (a) the former to
assess more accurately the degree to which new variables such as Euroscepticism
and anti-immigrant trends can reshape ethnopolitics, both as a living reality and a
field of study, across Central and Eastern Europe; (b) the latter to formulate new
interpretative models about how (right-wing) populist and Eurosceptic actors
embed their agendas inside the pre-existing political cultures of nationalism and
particularistic identity and memory politics.
The systemization of this interdisciplinary cooperation can be beneficial to the
study of ethnopolitics, nationalism and the populist and radical right not solely in the
Baltic States, or the Visegrad Four, but also inWestern Europe. In the beginning, this
chapter introduces and outlines the ethnosymbolic approach as well as the triadic and
quadratic configurations of ethnopolitics. Then, it proceeds into a more empirical
assessment of the applicability of these theoretical approaches in a series of case
studies during the 1990s; as well as the more recent emergence of new catalysts and
the ensuing necessity to update and upgrade the existing theoretical models.
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The Ethnosymbolic Approach: The Nation
as a Socio-psychological Phenomenon
The ethnosymbolic approach largely conceptualizes the modern nation as a socio-
psychological phenomenon. According to Anthony D. Smith, the modern nation
can be summarized as: ‘a named human population, sharing a historic territory,
common myths and historic memories, a mass public culture, a common economy
and common legal rights and duties for all its members’ (Smith 1999: 11) The
ethnos can be defined as: ‘a named human population with myths of common
ancestry, shared historic memories and one or more common elements of culture,
including an association with a homeland and some degree of solidarity, at least
among the elites’ (Ibid: 13). In this light, the nation is a broader notion than the
ethnos in that it addresses larger, more diverse and, primarily, political/civic
communities. Meanwhile, ethnonationalism, as an ideological current, largely casts
its focus on myths of common ancestry and the symbolism built around them; in
other words, the more socio-psychological components of nationhood.
In regard to the myths of common ancestry, perhaps the most powerful ones are
those referring to the linear continuity of the group through the ages and also those
pointing towards an older ‘golden age’ of the group. These myths acquire a poetic
and mystical dimension when associated with an ancestral or ‘sacred territory’ (e.g.
the focal locus of Kosovo and its symbolism in Serbian nationalism), hence the
importance attached to ‘sacred territories’ in all types of nationalist imagery.
‘Sacred territories’ are endowed with a poetic dimension: these are the territories
where the group flourished during its golden age and which have to be defended by
all means and at any cost.
The ultimate objective of constituent myths of origin is to create an overriding
commitment and bond for the group. Such myths aim to forge an imagined con-
tinuity of the group through the ages. Roughly speaking, there exist two types of
myths of origin: myths that point towards genealogical descent (‘biological conti-
nuity’ myths) and myths that cite an ancestry of a cultural-ideological variant.
‘Biological’ myths generate high levels of communal solidarity, since they regard
the national community as a network consisting of interrelated kin groups
descending from a common ancestor. In this case, imagined blood ties provide the
basis for a strictly primordialist sense of belonging and identity (e.g. certain currents
of Basque nationalism during the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century).
The other, and perhaps the most common, type of constituent myths of origin are
those that rest on the cultural affinity with the presumed ancestors. In this case, we
have to do with a spiritual type of kinship, which seeks to trace a ‘historical’ link
between the present ideals and aspirations of the group and those of its presumed
ancestors. Cultural-ideological myths of descent stress the persistence of certain
types of collective virtue (e.g. the ‘heroic spirit’) or other distinctive cultural
qualities such as language, religion and customs through the ages. They also seek to
draw a parallel between these old qualities and the present virtues and cultural
qualities of the group in question.
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By locating the present inside the context of the past of the group, constituent
myths of origin interpret social changes and collective aspirations in a way that
satisfies the drive for meaning, by making up new identities that also seem to be
very old. All myths of group descent have as focal point of reference an older
‘golden age’. Some examples of such ‘golden ages’ are, respectively, Periclean
Athens in Modern Greek nationalism and the mediaeval Nemanjid dynasty in
Serbian nationalism. The reference to a ‘golden age’ is always linked with a ‘myth
of decline’. The latter seeks to provide an explanation about how the community
fell from its state of prosperity in the past, to its present state of alleged decay.1 On
such occasions, the ‘golden age’ serves as a model for the regeneration of the
community.2
To sum up, then, in Anthony D. Smith’s words (Smith 2000: 82–83), constituent
myths of origin serve the following purposes:
1. They link past to present (or future) and act as models;
2. They possess external references of comparison, even implicitly;
3. They designate a space and time for action, a territorial program;
4. They contain impulses for collective action, mobilizing people;
5. They are developmental, assuming the possibility of change;
6. They are partly voluntaristic, in that successive generations may add to the
heritage and even regenerate themselves.
Such core myths persist and are espoused through state rituals, even in states
with a pronounced ‘civic’ character (e.g. United Kingdom and the United States)
(Mach 1989: 101–110).3 As far as their mobilizing power is concerned, this has
mainly to do with the fact that these myths pertain to the non-rational domain of the
‘nation’. Constituent myths of origin endow the nation with a near universality
through the employment of selected images and phrases (e.g. home, forefathers,
brothers and mother) that aim at forging a subconscious bond of integrity among its
members. This is of vital importance for mass mobilization since, as Walker
Connor phrases it, ‘people do not voluntarily die for things that are rational’
(Connor 1993: 206). Even Marxists–Leninists have taken advantage of the mobi-
lizing potential of constituent myths of origin, despite the philosophical incom-
patibility between nationalism and Communism (Ibid: 199).4
1For instance, nineteenth century Greek intellectuals (Adamantios Koraes, in particular) bewailed
the degeneration of their contemporary Greeks in comparison to the underlying genius of their
community, as revealed in its purest form during the golden age of Periclean Athens
(fifth century BC).
2On some occasions, the need for the regeneration of the community may acquire rather mystical
and semi-religious dimensions. A notable example is the notion of the ‘Serbian Golgotha’ in
Serbian nationalist imagery. On this issue, see Tomašić (1948: 30).
3An appropriate example of this kind is certain British state rituals (e.g. Remembrance Day).
4For example, Mao Tse-tung frequently stressed the ‘family ties’ among the Chinese people, and
their descent from a common ancestor (Huang-ti, the legendary first emperor of China).
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The academic value of the ethnosymbolic approach consists in that it seeks to
situate the position of constituent myths of origin inside modern nations. This, in
turn, helps set in context how the political and cultural/socio-psychological com-
ponents of modern nations may, in practice, overlap with each other.
Between Triadic and Quadratic Configurations
of Ethnopolitics
Rogers Brubaker has coined the concept of groupism. This notion addresses the
tendency to view ethnic groups and identities as bounded, regards them as the
leading protagonists of conflicts and treats them as the key units of social discourse.
Ethnic conflict is obviously the conflict between ethnic groups but these groups
should not be perceived as compact entities or ‘collective individuals’. In accor-
dance to Brubaker (2002: 163–189), group cohesion should be viewed as a con-
tinuous process that in some cases may be brought to completion but in others fail.
Within this frame of interpretation, the notion of categories is of pivotal signifi-
cance. For example, ‘Russian’, ‘Ukrainian’ or ‘Moldovan’ (as ethnic definitions)
constitute categories but not groups. In order for these categories to generate a high
degree of solidarity among a given number of people, become external markers and,
ultimately, culminate into group cohesion (or groupness), a whole process is
required.
The engineers of this process are certain actors, most commonly organizations,
who claim to speak in the name of an ethnic group. These organizations may range
from paramilitary formations and terrorist organizations to political parties and
cultural associations. Consequently, the strategies employed by these actors in order
to achieve groupness differ considerably from each other. They may range from
armed operations to political engagement within mainstream structures. The com-
mon denominator, however, remains the endeavour to make good use of the his-
torical background, constituent myths, as well as an array of cultural and
socio-psychological catalysts, in order to cement group cohesion (Ibid: 170–173).
Attention should be paid to the cognitive dimension of ethnic conflict. In other
words, what is it, specifically, that makes an armed or political conflict an ethnic
one? The ‘ethnic’ quality is not intrinsic to ethnic conflict. It is up to organizations
and a variety of individuals (e.g. government officials, political activists, journalists
and others) to frame and, ultimately, constitute a conflict as ethnic. Framing an
incident as a ‘pogrom’ or a ‘riot’ is not just a matter of external interpretation but an
act of definition that can have important consequences (Brubaker et al. 2004: 37 and
47). The more an organization succeeds in constituting a conflict as ethnic or
interpreting a governmental decision as detrimental to the group that this organi-
zation claims to represent, the more it succeeds in forging cohesion within the
group. This success acquires a higher significance if the organization manages to
internationalize its standpoints.
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Another useful concept, coined by Rogers Brubaker, is the triadic nexus theory
(Brubaker 1995: 109). According to the author, nationalism in multiethnic societies
is often a dynamic interaction among the ‘nationalizing state’, the national minority
(or minorities) living in that state and the minority’s (or the minorities’) external
national homeland (or kin-state). A ‘nationalizing state’ is the one which subtly
promotes the culture, language and political primacy of the titular nation within the
state through the governing institutions. Each of these actors is not a static entity but
a ‘variably configured and continuously contested political field’. The interaction
among these actors depends upon the relations and balances within each of them.
Within this framework, the minorities’ frequent response to the policies of the
‘nationalizing state’ is to push for more cultural or territorial autonomy and resist
actual or perceived policies of discrimination. The external homeland’s role is to
monitor the situation of their co-ethnics in the state in question, protest alleged
violations of their rights and assert the right, even the obligation, to defend their
interests.
The model of ethnic democracy can provide a trajectory for the nationalization
of political institutions and the public space. Based on the Israeli precedent, Sammy
Smooha defines ethnic democracy as an arrangement which ‘combines a structured
ethnic dominance with democratic rights for all’ (Smooha 2001: 8). Ethnic
democracy is ‘democracy that contains the institutionalization of dominance of one
ethnic group…the “democratic principle” provides equality between all citizens and
members of the society while the “ethnic principle” establishes preference and
dominance’ (Ibid: 24–25). Therefore, although providing the formal representative
institutions of liberal democracy, ethnic democracy tends to restrict the participation
of certain minority groups in the political processes. Two representative examples
of the ethnic democracy model and its implementation in Central and Eastern
Europe are the cases of post-Communist Estonia and Latvia.
Rogers Brubaker’s theoretical matrix became highly topical inside the back-
ground of numerous disputes over the collective statuses of ethnic minorities across
Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s. In light of the increasing significance
of international institutions/organizations and supranational processes in Central
and Eastern Europe, the prospect of EU membership started functioning as a
powerful pole of attraction for most post-Communist states. This enhanced the
EU’s soft power diplomacy vis-à-vis the candidate states. Soft power refers to the
aggregate of the formal, as well as informal, mechanisms that the EU has employed
in order to promote the candidate states’ compliance with the conditions that it has
set to them (Bruszt and Stark 2003; Haughton 2007). This development prompted
several academic experts to reformulate Brubaker’s triadic nexus into a quadratic
one, in light of the EU’s eastward enlargement, and add the EU as a fourth actor
inside the nexus (Pettai 2006; Smith 2002; Budryte 2005).
Due to its limited space, this chapter has mainly relied upon David Smith’s
concept of quadratic nexus (Smith 2002, 2003). In the author’s own words, ‘the
role of international organizations should be central to any discussion of
post-Communist identity politics in Central and Eastern Europe’ (Smith 2002: 9).
Slightly amending the terminology used by Brubaker, Smith argues that
32 V. Petsinis
‘Europeanization can thus be regarded as a variably configured and continuously
contested political field in which different states, organizations, parties, movements
or individual political entrepreneurs vie to impose their own particular political
agenda’ (Ibid: 11). On numerous occasions, the author contends that it was the
impact of the EU as a ‘fourth pillar’ that spurred the transition from ‘nationalizing
statehoods’ to multiple ‘integration strategies’, since the year 2000, throughout
Central and Eastern Europe (Smith 2003).
From the Theory to Practice: The 1990s
Empirical evidence from a series of conflicts, during the 1990s, testifies to the
validity of Rogers Brubaker’s outlook on ethnicity as a process (Brubaker 2002).
For instance, nowadays, it has become almost customary for academic and
non-academic experts to regard the multiple wars of secession within the former
Yugoslavia (1990s) primarily as ethnic conflicts. Nevertheless, this occurrence is
indissolubly linked to the multifaceted institutionalization of ethnicity (e.g. the
peoples/narodi and ethnic minorities or ‘nationalities’/narodnosti) inside a
multi-level constitutional arrangement (i.e. the republics, autonomous provinces
and self-management units) within the former Yugoslavia. These structural realities
gradually facilitated the joint endeavour by a multitude of external and internal
actors (e.g. political leaderships, paramilitary groupings, political activists and
journalists), during the 1990s, to frame these conflicts as primarily ethnic.
In regard to the triadic nexus theory, Yugoslavia’s contested dissolution process
(early and mid-1990s) witnessed the endeavour of virulent new leaderships to
re-nationalize the state institutions (i.e. Serbia under Slobodan Milošević and
Croatia under Franjo Tuđman). This resulted in discriminatory policies vis-à-vis
specific minority groups (e.g. ethnic Serbs in Croatia and ethnic Albanians in
Serbia) and the ensuing endeavour of their kin states to protest against perceived
violations of collective rights. These developments provided Rogers Brubaker with
the primary material for the conceptualization of the triadic nexus as a theoretical
model for the interpretation of ethnic conflict (Brubaker 1995).
During the same period, the ethnically diverse parts of Romania (namely
Transylvania) witnessed the symbolic competition between Romanian and ethnic
Hungarian nationalist groupings in the public space (e.g. in urban centres such as
Cluj-Napoca) as well as their simultaneous endeavour to generate groupness inside
the Romanian majority and the ethnic Hungarian minority. These developments on
the grass-roots level, in combination with the occasional interference by Romania’s
larger political parties as well as a string of Hungarian governments in Budapest,
provided Rogers Brubaker with additional raw material towards the further con-
cretization of the triadic nexus theory (Brubaker et al. 2008). Lastly, developments
such as the gradual heightening of the controversy between Northern Macedonia
and Greece over the cultural heritage of Ancient Macedonia, since the early 1990s,
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hinted at the validity of the ethnosymbolic approach in regard to the
socio-psychological appeal of constituent myths and symbols as well as their
potential intersection with the realm of foreign policy (Danforth 1997).
From the Theory to Practice: Contemporary Cases
By contrast, ethnicity never became institutionalized to the same degree within the
Soviet Union, whereas this federation never evolved to a highly multi-level
arrangement comparable to the former Yugoslavia. Therefore, despite any attempts
to ethnicize it, the conflict in Donbas (southeast Ukraine), for instance, is primarily
being perceived as a political one through a variety of angles. Moldova provides
one more environment where internal cleavages primarily revolve around favour-
able and non-favourable dispositions vis-à-vis the Kremlin and/or the Euro-Atlantic
institutions and not ethnicity per se.
However precarious it might be to regard the ongoing conflict in southeast
Ukraine as an ethnic one, Rogers Brubaker’s triadic nexus theory remains topical
inside this context. On the one hand, the post-Maidan era saw the coordinated
project by several political and non-political actors (e.g. journalists and segments of
the intelligentsia) in Russia with the objective to mobilize the anti-Maidan cohorts
in southeast Ukraine and elsewhere via the utilization of symbols associated with
the Great Patriotic War and the Soviet anti-Fascist struggle (1940s).5 On the other
hand, the post-Maidan realities accelerated the counter-project of the new elites in
Kyiv with the aims to: (a) ‘de-Sovietize’ Ukrainian national identity through the
excision of any visible vestiges from the Soviet era (e.g. the removal of remaining
monuments); (b) enhance the institutional status of the Ukrainian language in the
state administration and bureaucracy.
Moreover, in Russia, the period since 2014 has seen the orchestration of a joint
political-intellectual project with the objective to legitimize Crimea’s annexation
into the Russian Federation. As part of this endeavour, Crimea is portrayed as a
territory indissolubly linked with the Russian nation through time, through refer-
ences to the Crimean War (1853–1856) and other major historical events.6 On this
occasion, the intersection among constituent myths of origin, ancestral territories
and contemporary political objectives—as highlighted by the proponents of the
ethnosymbolic approach—becomes clear. The same thing can be argued about
the enduring relevance of the ethnosymbolic approach in regard to the
‘de-Sovietization’ process in post-Maidan Ukraine. In spite of their divergent
outlooks on ‘groupness’ and groupism, the two theoretical models discussed in this
5This project largely consisted in tentative portrayals of the war in southeast Ukraine as a conflict
between ‘neo-Fascists’ (i.e. the post-Maidan Ukrainian government) and ‘anti-Fascists’ (i.e. the
Donbas separatists). On this issue, see the relevant excerpts of Vladimir Putin’s Crimean speech
(18 March 2014) at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603.
6Ibid.
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chapter converge, if only by default, in that they both set in context how the
politicization (or, occasionally, weaponization) of ethnicity operates as a joint
socio-psychological and political process within different environments; hence, the
persisting relevance and validity of these theoretical approaches also in regard to
contemporary cases.
New Actors Enter the Fore: The Populist and Radical Right
in Central and Eastern Europe
Nevertheless, new catalysts have entered the fore and can decisively impact on the
study of ethnopolitics across Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, contro-
versies over immigration and the refugee crisis gain increasing significance and
they may even occasionally overshadow debates over ‘traditional’ cleavages with
ethnic implications (e.g. disputes over minority rights). On numerous occasions,
this largely remains a virtual debate in that the physical presence of war refugees
and other Muslim migrants in Central and East European societies is rather limited.
Still, this has sufficed for a wide spectrum of, mainstream as well as
non-mainstream, political actors to capitalize on the public apprehension over
immigration and augment their popularity. A common denominator among all these
endeavours has been the utilization of the cultural argumentation against the EU’s
fixed quotas arrangement for the redistribution of refugees.
For example, in Hungary, nominally centre-right, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán
justified his decision to erect a razor wire fence along the southern border (2015) via
accusing the European Commission of ‘irresponsibility’, underlining that ‘Europe
and European culture are rooted in Christian values’ and judging that ‘there is no
alternative, and we have no option but to defend Hungary’s borders’.7 Further to the
north, nominally centre-left, Slovakia’s Prime Minister, Robert Fico, attempted to
draw tentative comparisons between the refugee and the Roma questions arguing
that if the social integration of the Slovak Roma has been so complex, the social
integration of Muslim migrants would be tantamount to impossible.8 In this chapter,
however, primary attention is paid to the more coordinated and systematic
weaponization of the migration crisis by the populist and radical right.
A series of academic experts on the populist and radical right have highlighted a
qualitative difference between the political engagements of populist and radical
right-wing parties in Western and Eastern Europe (Allen 2017; Pytlas 2015),
whereas within the former context, the primary emphasis is laid on anti-immigrant
rhetoric, within the latter context, and ethnic minorities are seen to assume the role
7https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/03/migration-crisis-hungary-pm-victor-orban-
europe-response-madness.
8https://www.politico.eu/article/migrants-are-central-europes-new-roma-refugees-viktor-orban-
robert-fico/.
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of scapegoats. As Lenka Bustikova puts it, ‘in the more ethnically pluralistic
societies, (populist and radical right-wing) parties seeking electoral support mobi-
lize against constitutive, larger ethnic groups, with a high degree of politicization’
(e.g. the cases of Slovakia, Latvia and Croatia) (Bustikova 2018: 566–567). Since
the 1990s, this scapegoating has been legitimized through references to the longer
historical trajectories and the fears of irredentist tendencies among politicized
minority groups.
The same treatises contend that the concretization of the adequate protection of
the rights and freedoms of national minorities, as one of the conditions for accepting
post-Communist states into the EU (established by the Copenhagen Criteria,
1993),9 forged a solid bond among minority rights, democratization and
Europeanization (Bustikova 2015: 67). In this light, and to a remarkable extent, the
populist and radical right in the more ethnically pluralistic societies of Central and
Eastern Europe started building their Eurosceptic platforms on varying allegations
that the EU ‘imposes’ minority rights from the exterior and weakens national
sovereignty (i.e. the early and mid-1990s).10
Nevertheless, together with ethnonationalism, nativism has recently come to
occupy a locus of primary significance in the political engagement of East European
populist and radical right-wing parties. With specific regard to immigration and
citizenship, this notion holds that primacy must be given to the political rights, the
economic needs and the cultural identity of the ethnic/native members of the titular
nations (Mudde 2007; Pappas 2018). Therefore, if only schematically, nativism can
be designated as a sub-branch of ethnonationalism with a more concrete and pro-
nounced stress on anti-immigration and xenophobia. East European populist and
radical right-wing parties have re-appropriated key aspects from the pre-existing
political cultures of nationalism in specific countries and embedded them into their
agendas on anti-immigration.
For instance, on certain occasions, the anti-refugee and anti-immigration rhetoric
of the East European populist and radical right even seems to sideline more ‘tra-
ditional’ areas of discord in domestic ethnopolitics (e.g. the Naše Slovensko/‘Our
Slovakia’ party and its prioritization of the migration crisis over the ethnic
Hungarian question in Slovakia) (Kluknavská and Smolik 2016). On other occa-
sions, populist and radical right-wing parties (e.g. the Estonian Conservative
People’s Party/EKRE and Latvia’s National Alliance/NA) tend to interlink the
collective memories of ‘colonization’ under the Soviets (Annus 2012; Peiker 2016)
with the collective anxieties of becoming ‘colonized’ again by others in the future
(e.g. refugees and/or other migrants) (Braghiroli and Petsinis 2019; Kasekamp et al.
2018).
9Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council (1993, p. 7.A.iii), available online at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf (accessed 10 June 2018). Also, see
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm
(accessed 10 June 2018).
10On the case of Latvia, see: Björkman-Bennich and Johansson (2012), Kelley (2004: 83–84),
Jubulis (2001: 128–129).
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Furthermore, by contrast to the 1990s and the 2000s, the appeal of EU mem-
bership as an additional fourth actor inside Rogers Brubaker’s triadic nexus theory
seems to be eroding while various brands of Euroscepticism are on the rise.
Schematically, Euroscepticism can be defined as the: ‘outright and unqualified
opposition to the process of European integration’ (Taggart 1998: 365–366). In
practice, however, Euroscepticism is a multifaceted phenomenon. From a macro-
political perspective, Euroscepticism can become subordinated to pre-existing
ideological currents and manifest as either right wing or left wing. Depending on
either its firm rejection or more accommodating stance vis-à-vis the process of
European integration, it can be hard or soft. In correlation to the prevailing political
and socioeconomic circumstances, Euroscepticism can place a greater emphasis on
the economy, regional security, immigration and/or cultural identity issues (or
multiple combinations of all the above). Lastly, Euroscepticism can manifest in
European states inside as well as outside the EU (e.g. Serbia and Ukraine).
Hard Euroscepticism consists in the principled opposition to the EU and either
demands the withdrawal of given states from the EU or firmly objects to their
prospects of EU membership (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002: 4; Kopecky and
Mudde 2002; Flood and Usherwood 2005). Soft Euroscepticism does not entail the
principled opposition to the EU but centres on policy areas where a divergence
between the ‘national interest’ and the EU trajectory is perceived (Taggart and
Szczerbiak 2008; Kopecky and Mudde 2002). Meanwhile, two areas of utmost
significance for right-wing Eurosceptics across the Continent are: (a) varying
degrees of opposition to immigration and insistence on the principle of hard bor-
ders; (b) safeguarding national sovereignty from the ‘domination of Brussels’.
For instance, in the Baltic States, populist right-wing parties with an increasing
appeal and varying shades of, nominally soft, Eurosceptiscism (e.g. EKRE and NA)
cast doubts on the extent to which EU membership can upgrade the security status
of these states vis-à-vis Russia (i.e. geopolitical Euroscepticism). This is frequently
coupled with economic Euroscepticism and the subsequent calls for the taxation of
tax-free foreign capital11 as well as the objection to the acquisition of Estonian/
Latvian land by foreign nationals. Meanwhile, the sociocultural Euroscepticism of
the far right throughout Central and Eastern Europe capitalizes not solely on public
opposition to the EU’s fixed quotas for refugees but also on fears that the EU
promotes the import of ‘alien’ gender norms to these societies (e.g. the EU
guidelines on LGBT rights).
Even though the recent migration waves also constitute an ethnocultural ‘Other’,
this variant of otherness is a brand new one and qualitatively distinct from the
earlier instances of tension between national majorities and (‘settled’) ethnic
minorities. Furthermore, the prominent locus of nativism in the agendas of the
populist and radical right across Central and Eastern Europe often operates as a
catalyst which regulates, or even potentially ‘bridges’, the cleavages between
national majorities and, erstwhile ‘unreliable’, minority groups (e.g. ethnic
11EKRE (2015).
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Hungarians in Slovakia or ethnic Poles in Lithuania); in light of the mounting
apprehension vis-à-vis the new migrants. In addition, the constantly fluctuating and
non-territorial scope of the European migration crisis renders the triadic nexus
theory irrelevant within this particular context. Lastly, one might contend that,
beyond the triadic and quadratic configurations of ethnopolitics, Euroscepticism has
been emerging as a virulent fifth actor all over Central and Eastern Europe.
In Lieu of a Conclusion
As it becomes transparent in this chapter, the existing classification schemes for
ethnopolitics need to be updated and upgraded, especially in light of the latest
developments across Central and Eastern Europe. By contrast to the older treatises
on the populist and radical right in Central and Eastern Europe, and their greater
stress on the apprehension of these parties towards ethnic minorities, empirical
research demonstrates that several members of this party-family throughout the
macro-region have been seeking to augment their popularity along the systemiza-
tion of anti-immigrant engagement.12 In particular, an emerging nexus which
appears to be rather commonplace among parties of the populist and radical right in
Central and Eastern Europe is the one that consists of: domestic ethnopolitics,
regional geopolitics and ‘new’ identity politics (namely anti-immigration and, to a
secondary extent, opposition to LGBT rights). This nexus, in turn, seems to be
firmly anchored inside the Eurosceptic and anti-establishment agendas of these
parties.
In all of this, it should be borne in mind that the trajectories towards capitalizing
on anti-immigration sentiments have been rather idiosyncratic across Europe.
Anti-immigration parties and groupings tend to embed their narratives primarily
into symbols and imageries derived from their own societies’ historical experience.
In this light, the cooperation between academic experts in ethnopolitics and aca-
demic experts in the populist and radical right needs to become more extensive and
systematic. On the one hand, this will enable experts in ethnopolitics to assess more
precisely the degree to which new variables such as Euroscepticism and
anti-immigrant trends can reshape ethnopolitics, both as a living reality and a field
of study, across Central and Eastern Europe.
On the other hand, this systematic cooperation will enable experts in the populist
and radical right to formulate new interpretative models about how (right-wing)
populist and Eurosceptic actors across this region embed their agendas inside the
pre-existing political cultures of nationalism and particularistic identity and memory
politics. At a first instance, this will require a greater number of empirical, in-depth,
12On the Hungarian case and the party of Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary), see: Kovarek
et al. (2017: 63–87). For the party’s official position, see: ‘Immigration increases tensions in
Europe’ (https://www.jobbik.com/immigration_increases_tensions_europe) (accessed 12 June
2018).
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studies on the operation of specific political actors within specific countries.
Although this chapter is anchored in the political experience of Central and Eastern
Europe, as a departure point, this interdisciplinary cooperation can be equally
beneficial to the study of ethnopolitics, nationalism and the populist and radical
right in Western Europe.
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